A critical analysis is provided of the recent reorganisations of the downstream and petrochemical activities of BP and Shell. BP (or BP Amoco including Arco) and Shell are preparing for the next decade anticipating the environment and changing the companies to maximise their profitability in that environment, For The oil producing countries of The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) , there are lessons to be learned both from The forecasts which BP Amoco and Shell are making and from the way these companies intend to operate.
INTRODUCTION
The major oil companies reacted to participation by the leading oil producing companies in 1974 by a number of actions diversifying their businesses which in retrospect look quite silly. It took some years to dispose of the ragbag of activities, mostly expensively acquired. The majors then settled down to running their core businesses in oil and gas. Within the traditional business activities there was one casualty. The oil companies had not been good at owning and operating oil tankers; independents did it better and more cheaply. Furthermore, the surplus of tankers in the mid 1980s, when there were effectively two tankers available for every cargo of oil to be carried, forced a reappraisal of tanker ownership. Cutting back on tanker ownership demonstrated that large oil companies did not need ownership of all parts of the business and fully integrated operations. Again in retrospect, fully integrated operations and extensive central planning and coordination by the oil companies was expensive and inefficient.
The major oil companies change direction slowly. In the 1990s the oil majors became better at running their businesses, particularly BP and Exxon. All operations became more efficient, assets which were not providing a good return were sold and there was no reluctance to outsource a whole range of activities which previously had been carried out in-house. It was probably inevitable that having completed most of what could sensibly be done to run one oil company efficiently, there were substantial further gains to be made by combining the operations of two or more oil companies. This was the reasoning behind the joint venture marketing refining activities of Shell, Texaco and Saudi Aramco in the USA and of BP and Mobil in Europe in 1996. But why just have joint ventures? Takeovers could be even more profitable.
This paper provides some critical analysis of the reorganisation of the major oil companies in recent years. The review is not comprehensive but concentrates on some of the key issues. The activities of the major oil companies in the next century will be an important part of the world petroleum environment to which the oil exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa, MENA, will react. It is against the background set out in this paper that the key issues affecting MENA oil companies are assessed.
REORGANISATION OF THE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 2.1 BP-AMOCO·ARCO
Prior to its takeover of Amoco, BP had divested itself of BP Coal, BP Nutrition, BP Minerals, BP Detergents and numerous small non-petroleum activities. The activities of BP Chemicals had been streamlined. Through the 1980s and I990s, there had been numerous refinery closures and substantial cutbacks in oil marketing. BP's international marketing activities (aviation and marine) had numerous reorganisations but were not cut.
Whilst BP certainly favoured the upstream activities, these have not escaped rationalisation. In 1990, BP sold to Oryx (spun-off from Sun Oil) oil and gas production activities for $1 billion. These had been identified as being too small, requiring too much management time and absorbing too much of their profits to keep up production. Throughout most of the thirty years period to 1996, BP had invested heavily in R & D and technical support activities. There had been a negligible return on this investment which reached over £300 million pa in the early 1990s, reducing to £ 123 million by 1994. The last year in which R&D had a separate section in BP's annual report was in 1991 in which it was mentioned that BP's R&D activities were to be made more efficient and more closely linked to the business needs. During the 1990s, the R&D in most oil companies included substantial efforts on environmental topics. Without this essential environmentally related expenditure, the R&D budget is now small. BP's long term performance plan to revitalise the company was introduced in 1991. Through the 1990s, the plan was successful due to the setting of specific targets and the drive of an outstanding leader, Sir John Browne.
In July 1999, with the BP Amoco amalgamation substantially complete and the Arco takeover a virtual certainty, Sir John Browne outlined BP Amoco's strategic development plans. By the end of 200 I, BP Amoco will cut its costs by $4 billion pa and will dispose of $10 billion of relatively poor performing assets which should be viewed against capex of $26 billion over the same period. Clearly, further asset disposals will follow as BP Amoco repositions itself in the environment which emerges in the early years of the next century in what could be a period of rapid change.
Of the $10 billion disposals, $4 billion would be upstream and operating cost savings would be $2.2 billion pa.
The key strategic decisions behind the disposal of downstream assets was that BP Amoco would significantly reduce its global coverage and that the ratio between owned refining and oil products marketed would fall to between 60 and 70% compared with the 90% ratio in 1999. In part, the decision to reduce refining was taken on a forecast that refining capacity will grow faster than demand and that the global refining margin will average little more than an unsatisfactory $1 per barrel. In marketing oil products, BP Amoco is seeking a continuous reduction in costs and in the non-retail sector aiming to be the lowest cost supplier. In the retail markets, in addition to reducing costs there will be a continuous improvement in the quality of sites and a growth in merchandise sales. The petroleum products business is expected to divest of $3 billion assets over the next three years.
Over the last decade, global growth in petrochemicals has exceeded GDP growth by 50%. BP Amoco already has 60% of its petrochemical assets in businesses where the growth is above average. BP Amoco will continue to restructure in petrochemicals divesting $2.5 billion of assets, unit costs are targeted to fall by 25% and capex will be directed to businesses with above average growth. The petrochemicals business will produce abut 20 million tonnes of product pa, will continue to be the world leader in the merchant acetic acid market, lead in acrylonitrile technology and have strong positions in Europe in polyethylene, polybutene, styrenics and oxygenated solvents. Expansion will also be favoured around "ideal" sites near BP Amoco refineries or convenient for BP Amoco produced hydrocarbon feedstocks.
A petrochemicals business which will not deliver a competitive return of at least the cost of capital at the bottom of the cycle will not be of interest to BP Amoco.
It is rumoured that BP Amoco will change its lubricants business by giving Bunnah Castrol control and taking a 20% equity stake in the enlarged company. The logic behind this move is that lubricants consumption is static, there is no need for BP Amoco to carry out its own R&D and it is likely that such an arrangement would increase the (small) profitability of the lubricants business for BP Amoco. Before this can be done, BP Amoco needs to disentangle the BP Amoco-Mobil arrangement for lubricants marketing in Europe.
SHELL
Through 1999, the yield obtainable on Shell shares has been 33% higher than that obtainable on BP Amoco. If the stock exchange rating of Shell at a discount on BP-Amoco is justified (and stock exchange ratings are often wrong), what are the reasons for it?
The key factor is that the management of BP Amoco led by Sir John Browne has proved better than Shell's management.
Shell has certainly suffered in comparison with BP with BP's takeover of Amoco soon followed by Arco and with Exxon with its takeover of Mobil. The hastily conceived and aborted joint venture in the European downstream sector with Texaco in 1998 suggested a panic response by Shell to activities by other major oil companies.
Shell once had the best PR of all the oil companies but it certainly does not now. Shell's handling of the Brent Spar oil platform scrapping and failing to demonstrate clearly what an asset the company has been to Nigeria have inflicted long term damage on Shell's image. Shell's obsession with its image with poorly chosen adverts in poorly chosen papers has certainly not enhanced Shell's image in the way it must have intended.
Shell's Global Brand Tracker Survey published in 1998 showed that in a survey of 97 countries, Shell was rated first in 26 countries, compared with Exxon in two and BP in two. Observers were puzzled when Shell immediately launched its "Profits and Principles" campaign stating: "The inwardly-focused Shell must become a thing of the past".
Bad publicity, centred on items which do not have a significant effect on Shell's profits, can affect the share price.
Shell is seen to be at a disadvantage to BP in several ways:
Shell has an inefficient management structure due to its 60% Royal Dutch and 40% Shell Transport and Trading equity holdings.
Shell has revered the concept of an integrated oil company to its disadvantage by over-investing in activities which have been financial disasters, eg Shell Tankers.
Shell has placed too much reliance on planning and on R&D. These activities have been divorced from mainstream businesses and corporately funded. Large investments in planning and in R&D have provided poor financial returns.
Shell is intent on having business activities in as many countries as possible and has always been reluctant to dispose of unprofitable activities.
Shell in intent on carrying out too many non-essential activities in-house rather than buying in at a much reduced cost.
Shell has in fact taken some drastic actions to improve its profitability. In 1998
Shell cut 20% of its downstream workforce in Europe and closed large regional head offices in London UK and in France, Germany and Holland. At the end of 1998, Shell wrote off $4.5 billion of oil and chemicals assets. Shell announced the disposal of $7 billion assets of its petrochemcals businesses. "The Times" criticised Shell for selling petrochemicals businesses at the bottom of the cycle and stated that it seemed that the job losses would be suffered by the troops not by the generals; the people who overpaid for Texan gas pipelines and who had taken the (poor) decisions that put Shell into its end-1998 unsatisfactory position were still in power. In his letter to shareholders in September 1999, Shell's Chairman stated that the Group was moving into "power generation, renewable resources and other high margin areas" and will concentrate on "solar energy and fast growing forests". "Shell predicts that renewables could account for 50% of the energy market by 2050". This forecast is part of Shell's "substantial growth" scenario. Also part of Shell's scenario planning is that 70% of remaining hydrocarbon resources is coal.
Since 1974 Shell has been developing a high pressure coal gasification process. Shell Research has also led in the conversion of gases to transport fuels. The logic behind this R&D is that as conventional crude oils become more expensive to find and produce, ie cost more (nothing to do with the way they are taxed or priced), there will be more scope for the use of tar sands (extra heavy crude oils) and coal to manufacture transport fuels (mogas, road diesel and jet kerosine). Shell is in a strong position to introduce this technology when appropriate. It was therefore a surprise when, at the end of August 1999, Shell stated that its coal business was now a non-core activity and was for sale. Shell's present coal production is high quality low cost, ie ideal for electricity production and is profitable. An Australian power plant presently under construction is also being sold. The key statistics for Shell" coal business since 1980 are included in Table 1 .
Renewables, photovoltaics and forestry, remain core businesses for Shell. The size of the renewables business is small in Shell's context. BP's photovoltaics business has always been loss making and it is unlikely that Shell will obtain profits from photovoltaics for some years. A key element in Shell's faith in photovoltaics as a core business could be their forecast that 50% of the world's energy could come from renewables by the year 2050. But on Shell's track record there could be too much investment too soon with profits arriving much later than expected.
Over an 18 year period Shell averaged just £8 million pa profit from its coal business. Shell's market share of world coal production was at a maximum of 1% equivalent to about 5% of internationally traded coal.
A key difference between BP Amoco and Shell in the downstream sector is that BP Amoco considers that refining will always be volatile with low profitability whilst Shell considers it will become profitable. "The refining problem is not permanent. 1 think the greatest pain will be over in a few years". (President of Royal Dutch Shell, September I998).Shell aims to be oil products supply balanced with pacesetter status and to be a strong global oil products trader. Optimistically, losses on oil tanker operations are considered to be a thing of the past.
Shell's petrochemicals activities date from 1929 and have grown to make it one of the largest petrochemical companies in the world. During the 1980s, world production of base petrochemicals doubled from about 70 to 140 million tonnes. However, as will be seen from Table 2 , the rush to build capacity led to poor utilisation in some years, eg just 58% for ethylene capacity in 1981 and 55% in 1982.
During the 1990s, the cyclical nature of the petrochemical industry became accepted and there were downturns following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and with the Asia-pacific economic crisis.
In 1998, Shell Chemical's profits were sharply down, exacerbated by losses on asset disposals and restructuring/redundancy costs. From Table 2 , it will be seen that Shell has made no progress over a twenty year period in the key ethylene production business on both volumes and proceeds/profits. Although Shell had attempted to protect sales prices by minimising sales of base petrochemicals, unit proceeds on industrial chemicals and polymers, or as reclassified "performance products" and "differentiated products", the unit sales prices of these categories were also down in 1997 and even worse in 1998.
As a consequence, Shell has taken or is taking similar actions in its petrochemical businesses to those taken in its oil business. Shell's petrochemical businesses will be reduced from 21 to 13. Staff, which had been allowed to increase from 17 000 in 1994 to 23 000 in 1996, were cut to 20 000 in 1998.
In future, Shell Petrochemicals will concentrate on businesses in which they possess leading technologies and operate the lowest cost plants by worldwide criteria. If this occurs many other large petrochemical companies worldwide will lead to much restructuring and asset swapping in the petrochemicals sector. 4030  160  500  340  1996  4399  95  4180  190  530  340  1997  5195  85  4420  190  540  350  1998  5259  88  4630  130  410 280 ** The value added is the difference between the price of ethylene and the price of naphtha * Rebased using Shell's equity stake in jointly owned plants Notes: The prices for naphtha and for ethylene are typical North West Europe bulk market prices. In any year there can be a considerable range. MEN A-based petrochemical companies could find opportunmes to improve their petrochemical businesses as Shell and other GECD-based petrochemical companies consolidate and divest.
A key point shown by the statistics in Table 3 is that Shell failed to hold its margins in performance products and in differentiated products in 1997 and in 1998 In retailing, Shell will abandon its wholesaling role and have top quality retail sites with the branded "Select" convenience stores. In the commercial, marine, aviation and LPG markets, Shell will seek the high value customers with products/services packages.
In the USA the Equilon Enterprises in the west and Motiva Enterprises in the east are seen to be alliances which will become more profitable than solo Shell operations.
Worldwide Shell and Exxon have pooled their fuel and lubricant additives businesses into a new company, Infineum, which operated from 1999. The formation of Infineum has cut the costs of additive research and put the business on an improved commercial basis.
The nine large national oil companies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) produce about 1 million b/d or more. Whatever arrangements these nine oil companies come to with the large DECO-based oil companies for oil and gas exploration and production, there is much to be gained optimising their downstream interests with or without the involvement of the DECO oil companies. In previous APS conferences there have been debates on the possibility of expansion of oil refining in the MENA region. The divergent lines taken on refining profitability by BP Amoco (poor) and by Shell (will soon become good) do not make decisions regarding building new refinery capacity any easier.
Ironically, the more companies that support the BP Amoco view, the sooner refining will become profitable. But the MENA-based oil companies will want to expand their refining when it is appropriate to do so. In particular, for countries producing high sulphur crude oils there will be considerable scope in the future for obtaining value added by local refining. The refineries in Kuwait are good examples.
If BP Amoco is going to buy more than 30% of its refined product requirements, which will be required in Europe and in the USA, there could be opportunities for long-term agreements of any type between MENA-based companies and DECO-based oil companies for product supply. The DECO oil companies will continue to operate their oil marketing companies at arm's length from their oil producing and oil refining companies and in theory this should facilitate arm's length product purchasing agreements.
As a result of the DECO oil companies eliminating storage (terminals and depots) in recent years, together with the scrapping of DECO-based refining capacity, the wholesale market for refined oil products is tightening. MENA-based oil companies may therefore seek to control oil products storage in DECO countries to facilitate wholesaling of oil products in barge or cargo sized quantities.
The outlook for MEN A-based oil companies acting alone expanding or establishing sales to end users (commercial consumers and retail motor fuels) in DECO countries is poor. The Motiva Enterprises venture in the USA (Shell/TexacoISaudi Aramco) is a model which other MENA-based oil companies could aspire to. The experience of Kuwait in the UK has demonstrated this is not a satisfactory way to expand downstream. There is no purpose in having a small independent operation which has a small market share. The way forward for Kuwait companies operating independently in Western Europe is to amalgamate to form much larger units or simply sell out. This is what the majors are doing; try to be big enough to influence the market, be low cost operations and make a profit. Otherwise it is sensible to quit selected markets.
The fact that the DECO-based oil companies are more willing than ever before to sell assets provides a favourable environment for MEN A-based oil companies to establish significant positions. But they should plan that such positions are strong positions.
The reshaping of the petrochemical businesses also provides opportunities for MEN A-based companies. Like the DECO-based companies, MENA-based companies could seek to establish strong positions in certain selected petrochemicals. Through MENA exports of LPG and condensates, alliances could be established with DECDbased petrochemicals companies in which the price of feedstocks is linked to the profitability of the petrochemicals venture. This model has been used by Methanex for methanol production.
In summary, the reorganisation of the OEeD-based majors could present opportunities for MENA-based companies to establish alliances which provide security of outlets and value added.
